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Abstract—When a software system fails in the field, on a user
machine, and the failure is reported to the developers, developers
in charge of debugging the failure must be able to reproduce
the failing behavior in house. Unfortunately, reproducing field
failures is a notoriously challenging task that has little support
today. Typically, developers are provided with a bug report that
contains data about the failure, such as memory dumps and,
in the best case, some additional information provided by the
user. However, this data is usually insufficient for recreating
the problem, as recently reported in a survey conducted among
developers of the Apache, Eclipse, and Mozilla projects. Even
more advanced approaches for gathering field data and help
in-house debugging tend to collect either too little information,
which results in inexpensive but often ineffective techniques, or
too much information, which makes the techniques effective but
too costly. To address this issue, we present a novel general
approach for supporting in-house debugging of field failures,
called BUGREDUX. The goal of BUGREDUX is to synthesize,
using execution data collected in the field, executions that
mimic the observed field failures. We define several instances
of BUGREDUX that collect different types of execution data and
perform, through an empirical study, a cost-benefit analysis of
the approach and its variations. In the study, we use a tool
that implements our approach to recreate 17 failures of 15 real-
world programs. Our results are promising and lead to several
findings, some of which unexpected. In particular, they show
that by collecting a suitable yet limited set of execution data the
approach can synthesize in-house executions that reproduce the
observed failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quality-assurance activities, such as software testing and
analysis, are notoriously difficult, expensive, and time-
consuming. As a result, software products are typically re-
leased with faults or missing functionality. The characteristics
of modern software are making the situation even worse.
Because of the dynamic nature, configurability, and portability
of today’s software, deployed applications may behave very
differently in house and in the field. In some cases, these
different behaviors may be totally legitimate behaviors that
simply were not observed during in-house testing. In other
cases, however, such behaviors may be anomalous and result
in field failures, failures of the software that occur after
deployment, while the software is running on user machines.
Field failures are not only difficult to foresee, but they are
also often difficult, if not impossible, to reproduce outside the
time and place in which they occurred. In fact, a recent survey
among many developers of the Apache, Eclipse, and Mozilla
projects revealed that most developers consider information on
how to reproduce failures (e.g., stack traces, steps to follow,
and ideally even test cases) as the most valuable—and also
most difficult to obtain—piece of information in a bug re-
port [1]. This pressing need is demonstrated by the emergence,
in the last decade, of several reporting systems that collect
information such as stack traces and register dumps when a
program crashes and send it back to the software producer
(e.g., [2], [3]). Although useful, the information collected by
these systems is often too limited to allow for reproducing a
failure and is typically used to identify correlations among
different crash reports or among crash reports and known
failures.
To better support developers in their debugging activities,
researchers have also investigated more sophisticated tech-
niques for capturing data from deployed applications (e.g.,
[4]–[10]) and using them for debugging. Among these tech-
niques, some collect only limited amounts of information
(e.g., sampled branch profiles in the case of CBI [6], [7]).
These techniques have the advantage of collecting types of
data that are unlikely to be sensitive, which makes them more
likely to be accepted by the user community. Moreover, given
the amount of information collected, it is conceivable for
users to manually inspect the information before it is sent
to developers.
Unfortunately, subsequent research has shown that the
usefulness of the information collected for debugging in-
creases when more (and more detailed) data is collected,
and researchers have defined novel techniques that gather
a wide spectrum of richer data, ranging from path profiles
to complete execution recordings (e.g., [4], [5], [11], [12]).
Complete execution recordings, in particular, can address the
issue of reproducibility of field failures. User executions,
however, have the fundamental drawbacks that (1) they can be
expensive to collect and (2) they are bound to contain sensitive
data. While the former issue can be alleviated with suitable
engineering (e.g., [5], [11]), the latter issue would make the
use of these techniques in the field problematic. Given the
sheer amount of data collected, users would not be able to
manually check the data before they are sent to developers,
and would therefore be unlikely to agree on the collection of
such data. Although some techniques exist whose goal is to
sanitize or anonymize collected data, they are either defined
for a different goal, which means that they would eliminate
sensitive data only by chance (e.g., [13], [14]), or are still in
their early phase of development and in need of more thorough
evaluation (e.g., [15], [16]).
The overall goal of this work is to address these limitations
of existing techniques by developing novel approaches for
reproducing field failures in house without imposing too much
overhead on the users and without violating the users’ privacy.
More precisely, we aim to develop a general technique that
can synthesize, given a program P , a field execution E of P
that results in a failure F , and a set of execution data D for E,
an in-house execution E′ as follows. First, E′ should result
in a failure F ′ that is analogous to F , where by analogous
we mean that F ′ has the same observable behavior of F . (If
F is the violation of an assertion at a given location in P ,
for instance, F ′ should violate the same assertion at the same
point.) Second, E′ should be an actual execution of program
P , that is, the approach should be sound and generate an actual
input that, when provided to P , results in execution E′ and,
thus, failure F ′. Third, the approach should be able to generate
E′ using only P and D, without the need of any additional
information. Finally, D should not contain sensitive data and
should be collectable with low overhead on E.
As a first step towards our goal, in this paper we present
BUGREDUX, a general technique (and a tool that implements
the technique) for (1) collecting different kinds of execution
data and (2) using the collected data to synthesize in-house
executions that can reproduce failures observed in the field.
Intuitively, BUGREDUX can be seen as a general framework
parameterized along two dimensions: the kind of execution
data D collected and the technique used for synthesizing
execution E′. We present four variations, or instances, of
BUGREDUX that all share the same synthesis technique (i.e.,
symbolic execution) but differ in the kind of execution data
they use. Specifically, we considered four types of increas-
ingly rich execution data: points of failure, stack traces, call
sequences, and complete program traces.
We also present an empirical investigation in which we
assess the tradeoffs that characterize the variations of BU-
GREDUX with respect to (1) the cost of the data collection, in
terms of space and time overhead (and, indirectly, likelihood
to contain sensitive data), and (2) the ease of synthesizing a
failing execution starting from such data. In the evaluation,
we used an implementation of BUGREDUX developed for
the C language and applied it on 17 failures of 15 real-
world programs. For each failure, we collected the four
different types of execution data, measured the overhead of the
collection, and tried to synthesize an execution that reproduced
the failure using such data. Interestingly, our results show that
the richest data, beside being the most expensive to collect and
the most problematic in terms of potential privacy violation,
is not necessarily the most useful when used for synthesizing
executions. Our results also confirm that, at least for the cases
we considered, information that is traditionally collected by
crash-report systems, such as a call stack at the point of failure,
is typically not enough for recreating failures in house, and
richer information is needed.
For the current incarnation of BUGREDUX, we found that
the best option in terms of cost-benefit ratio is the use of
call sequences. As our study show, using call-sequence data,
BUGREDUX was able to recreate 16 out of the 17 failures
considered while imposing an acceptable time and space
overhead. We believe that these results, albeit preliminary in
nature, are encouraging and motivate further research in this
direction. In fact, as we discuss in the final part of the paper,
we have already identified several opportunities for further
reducing the cost of the data collection while maintaining the
same ability of recreating field failures.
This paper provides the following novel contributions:
• A general framework for collecting execution data in the
field and using the data to synthesize executions that can
help reproduce field failures.
• The instantiation of the framework for four different
kinds of execution data and one execution synthesis
technique and its implementation in a tool that is freely
available for download as open source (http://www.cc.gatech.
edu/∼orso/software/bugredux.html).
• An empirical study in which we analyze the tradeoffs
offered by the different types of data considered in terms
of cost of the data collection and ease of synthesizing
failing executions.
II. BACKGROUND AND TERMINOLOGY
Before discussing our approach, we briefly provide some
necessary background information on symbolic execution and
define some terms that we use in the rest of the paper.
Symbolic Execution: In its most general formulation,
symbolic execution is a technique that executes a program
using symbolic instead of concrete inputs. At any point in
the computation, the program state consists of a symbolic
state expressed as a function of the inputs; and the conditions
on the inputs that cause the execution to reach that point is
expressed as a set of constraints in conjunctive form called
the path condition (PC) [18]. More formally, the symbolic
state can be seen as a map S : M 7→ E , where M is the
set of memory addresses for the program, and E is the set of
possible symbolic values, that is, expressions in some theory
T such that all free variables are input values.
Both the symbolic state and the PC are built incrementally
during symbolic execution, with PC initialized to true, each
input expressed as a symbolic variable, and S initialized
according to the semantics of the language. (In C, for instance,
memory addresses not yet initialized could be mapped to ⊥ to
indicate that they are undefined.) Every time a statement stmt
that modifies the value of a memory location m is executed,
the new symbolic value e′ of m is computed according to
stmt’s semantics, and S is updated by replacing the old
expression for m with e′ (S ′ = S ⊕ [m 7→ e′], where ⊕
indicates an update). Conversely, when a predicate statement
pred that modifies the flow of control is executed, symbolic
execution forks and follows both branches. Along each branch,
the PC is augmented with an additional conjunct that rep-
resents the input condition, expressed in terms of symbolic
state, that makes the predicate in pred true or false
(depending on the branch). Note that, for simplicity, we
assume that conditional statements only have two branches;
extending to the case of more than two branches is trivial. We
also assumed that both branches are feasible; a Satisfiability
Modulo Theories (SMT) solver could be invoked at every
branch to check whether the PC for that branch has a solution
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function foo(int a, int b, int c) {
1. int d = a + 4
2. if (d < b)
3. //do something
4. if (b > 5)
5. //do something
6. else if (a < 5)








Figure 1. Simple code example to illustrate symbolic execution.
and, if the solver provides a response, eliminate the branch
from consideration if this is not the case.
Symbolic execution, when successful, can be used to com-
pute an input that would cause a given path to be executed
or a given statement to be reached. To do so, at program
exit or at a point of interest in the code, the PC for that
point would be fed to an SMT solver, which would try to
find a solution for PC. Such a solution would consist of an
assignment to the free variables in PC (i.e., , the inputs) that
satisfies PC. If such a solution is found, the corresponding
input is exactly the input that we wanted to compute. To
illustrate symbolic execution with an example, consider the
code snippet in Figure 1. We indicate the symbolic inputs for
the parameters a, b, and c with a0, b0, and c0. When symbolic
execution follows path 〈1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 13〉, for instance, the
symbolic state at statement 13 is {[a 7→ a0], [b 7→ b0], [c 7→
c0], [d 7→ a0 + 4]}, and the corresponding PC would be
(a0 + 4 < b0) ∧ (b0 <= 5) ∧ (a0 < 5) ∧ (a0 + 4 < c0),
which corresponds to the conjunction of the predicates for
branches 2T , 4F , 6T , and 7T . A possible solution for this
PC is the set of assignments a0 = 0, b0 = 5, and c0 = 5,
which correspond to an input i = {0, 5, 5} that causes path
〈1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 13〉 to be followed.
Terminology: A control flow graph (CFG) for a function
f is a directed graph G = 〈N,E, entry, exit〉 where N is a
set of nodes that represent statements in f and E ⊆ N ×N
is a set of edges that represent the flow of control between
nodes, and entry ∈ N and exit ∈ N are the unique entry
and exit points, respectively, for the CFG.
An interprocedural control flow graph (ICFG) is a graph
built by composing a set CFGs. To build an ICFG, CFGs are
connected based on call relationships between the functions
they represent. If a function f1 calls a function f2, the two
CFGs for f1 and f2, G1 and G2, are connected as follows:
the node n in f1 representing the call site to f2 is replaced by
two nodes nc (call node) and nr (return node), such that all
predecessors of n are connected to nc, and nr is connected
to all successors of n. Then, nc is connected to G2’s entry
node, and G2’s exit node is connected to nr. This process is
repeated for every call site in the program.
Given a program P , a failing execution E of P for a given
input I , and the resulting failure F , we define the following
terms. We call F a field failure if it occurred on a user
machine, after P has been deployed. A point of failure (POF)
is the statement in P where F manifests itself. For the sake of
the discussion, and without loss of generality, we assume that a
failure corresponds to a failing assertion, and that POF is the
statement in which the assertion fails (all failure conditions
can be expressed in the form of assertions in the code). A
failure call stack for F is the ordered list of functions that
were on the call stack when F occurred. Each entry in the
list consists of a function and a location in the function (i.e.,
either the location of the call to the next function in the list or,
for the last entry, the location of the failure). In the rest of the
paper, we refer to the failure call stack for F as F ’s call stack
or simply call stack, except for cases where the term may
be ambiguous. A call sequence for E is the sequence of calls
executed (i.e., call sites traversed) during E. A complete trace
for E is the sequence of all branches (i.e., program predicates
and their outcomes) exercised during E. Obviously, complete
traces subsume call sequences. We use the term execution data
for E to refer to any dynamic information collected during E.
Therefore, call sequences and complete traces are examples
of execution data. Finally, a crash report for F is a record
that is produced when F occurs and can be later sent to P ’s
developers. Although crash reports can have different formats
and contents, we assume that a crash report contains at least a
POF and a call stack, and possibly some additional execution
data.
III. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
We introduce an example that we use in the rest of the
paper to motivate our work, show the challenges involved
in reproducing observed failures, and illustrate our technique.
Our example, shown in Figure 2, is taken from the Coreutils
library [17]. Specifically, we selected a piece of code that
contains a fault and simplified it to make it self contained and
easier to understand for the reader.
The example program takes a string argument from
the command line and consists of five functions:
main, process, uppercase, replaceescape,
and printresult. Function main first checks that exactly
one command-line argument is present (lines 39–40) and that
the length of the input parameter is less than 256 characters
(lines 41–42). It then allocates an array of 256 characters,
which will be used to store the result of the execution, and
invokes function process with the input argument and the
newly created array as parameters (line 44).
Function process scans each character in its input string
and adds it to the output string after processing it in one of
three ways. If the character is alphabetical and lower-case,
it is replaced with the corresponding upper-case character by
invoking function uppercase (lines 26–27). If the character
is part of an escape sequence, it is replaced using function
replaceescape (lines 28–30). This function replaces the
character with either a new line or a tab, if the escape sequence
is one of \n or \t, or with the null character otherwise.
All other characters are simply copied to the output string
unmodified (lines 31–32). After all input characters have been
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1. char replaceescape(char e) {









11. char uppercase(char l) {
12. return l-’a’+’A’;
13. }
14. void printresult(char* str,int length) {
15. int i;





21. void process(char* source, char* dest) {
22. int out=0;
23. int in=0;
24. int srclength = strlen(source);
25. while (in<srclength) {
26. if (source[in]>=’a’&&source[in]<=’z’) {
27. dest[out]=uppercase(source[in]);
28. } else if (source[in]==’\\’) {
29. dest[out]=replaceescape(source[in+1]);
















Figure 2. Example of faulty program.
processed, function process calls function printresult,
which prints out the generated output string.
The fault in the code is at line 30, in function process.
After processing an escape sequence, the code increments the
index of the output array out instead of that of the input array
in. The first consequence of this fault is that one character is
skipped in the output string, and an extra character is added to
the string. For a sequence “\n”, for instance, both a newline
character and character “n” would be added to the output,
with an undefined character in between. Another, probably
more serious, effect is that the index of the output array will
grow larger than the index of the input array by one for each
escape character processed. Therefore, if the number of escape
characters plus the length of the input array were to exceed
256, which is the size of the output array, this fault will cause
a memory error.
This is a simple, yet interesting fault, as the memory error
would be triggered only by an input with the following char-
acteristics: (1) the input must contain less than 256 characters,
to pass the initial test, and (2) the sum of the length of the
input plus the number of escape characters it contains must
be greater than 256. Note that this also implies that the input
must contain at least two escape characters, as the input string





#0 00000388 in process (source=\\
185417824, dest=186177720) at example.c:27
#1 00000492 in main (argc=\\
2, argv=180717480) at example.c:44
Figure 3. Crash report for our example program.
can contain 256. Because it requires a specially-crafted input
to be triggered, such a fault that may not be revealed by an
in-house test suite (even one that covers all branches in the
program) and could therefore result in a field failure.
Let us assume that the program is released with the fault
at line 30 that we just discussed, and that a user provides an
input that triggers the fault and results in a memory error at
line 27, when the program tries to write the 257th character in
the output array. In this situation, the runtime system would
generate a crash report such as the one shown in Figure 3. As
the figure shows, the crash report lists the POF for F (line 27
of example.c), and the call stack at the moment of failure,
with one entry per call on the stack.
A developer who is assigned this bug report and wants
to investigate the problem would likely try to reproduce the
failure, which is far from trivial. Imagine, for instance, that the
developer tried to use purely random testing to reach the POF
and generate F . It would be unlikely that such an approach
could generate, by chance, an input that satisfies the failing
conditions for F .
Even more sophisticate approaches, such as those based
on symbolic execution or some other verification techniques,
would have a hard time triggering the faulty behavior without
any guidance. Given that (1) the length of the input string
plus the number of escape characters should be greater than
256, and (2) the loop in function process increments the
output array’s index by at most two characters per iteration,
the shortest failing path would be one that traverses the loop
128 times and, for all iterations but the last one, follows
path {26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34}. Finding this path using symbolic
execution would not be possible if the number of loop
iterations were bounded to some small value, as it is typically
the case to make the exploration feasible (e.g., [18]–[20]).
With unbounded loop exploration, on the other hand, symbolic
execution may have to explore three paths for each iteration,
which would result in 3n paths explored for n iterations—a
number that would quickly grow to impractically large values.
For this example, thus, the POF and the call stack are
unlikely to provide enough information to help developers
reproduce and debug the reported field failure. To do so, de-
velopers would need additional information and, specifically,
information about the length of the input and the number
of escape characters in it. However, this information could
be provided in many ways, and by collecting many different
kinds of data (e.g., profiles, input values, invariants). Most
importantly, the kind of data needed is likely to depend on the
specific failure considered. As a first step towards defining a
technique for reproducing field failures in house, it is therefore












Figure 4. Intuitive high-level view of BUGREDUX.
execution data in this context. To investigate this issue, we
defined a general approach for synthesizing executions that (1)
mimic executions that resulted in field failures and (2) try to
reproduce such failures. We instantiated several variants of our
approach that differ in the kind of execution data they use, and
studied the effectiveness of these different variants. The next
sections discuss our approach and our empirical investigation.
We also show how (one instance of) the approach would be
able to recreate the failure in our example.
IV. A GENERAL APPROACH FOR RECREATING FIELD
FAILURES
As stated in the Introduction, our overall goal is to be
able to recreate field failures in a faithful way (i.e., in a way
that allows for debugging the failures) by using information
collected in the field (i.e., execution data) that can be gathered
without imposing too much space and time overhead to the
field executions. To achieve this goal, we developed a general
approach that we call BUGREDUX. Intuitively, BUGREDUX
operates by (1) collecting different kinds of execution data and
(2) using the collected data to synthesize in-house executions
that reproduce failures observed in the field. Figure 4 provides
a high-level overview of BUGREDUX and of the scenario we
target.
As the figure shows, BUGREDUX consists of two main
components. The first component is the instrumenter, which
takes as input an application provided by a software developer
and generates an instrumented application that can collect
execution data while being executed in the field and add the
execution data to crash reports from the field. The second
component is the analyzer, which takes as input a crash report
and tries to generate a test input that, when provided to the
application, results in the same failure that was observed in
the field. A software tester can then use the generated input
to recreate and try to debug the field failure. This general
approach can be defined in different ways depending on the
kind of execution data collected and on the technique used for
synthesizing execution.
A. Instrumenter and Analyzer Components
Instrumentation is a well assessed technology, so we do
not discuss this part of the approach further. It suffices to
say that BUGREDUX adds probes to the original program
that, when triggered at runtime, generate the execution data
of interest. Conversely, the analyzer is the core part of the












Figure 5. The analysis component of BUGREDUX.
provides a more detailed view of the analysis component of
BUGREDUX, puts the problem in context and let us discuss
how we addressed this challenge. As the figure shows, the
inputs to the analyzer are an application program P , whose
execution E produces failure F that we want to reproduce,
and a crash report C for F . The goal of the analyzer is to
generate a test input that would result in an execution E′ that
“mimics” E and would fail in the same way.
Given crash report C, the input generator would analyze
program P and try to generate such test input. The exact
definition of mimicking depends on the amount of information
about the failing execution E that is available. If only the POF
were available, for instance, E′ would mimic E if it reaches
the POF. Conversely, if a complete trace were to be used, E′
would have not only to reach the POF but also to follow the
same path as E. This concept of mimicking is defined within
the input generator, which receives the execution data in the
form of a sequence of goals (or statements) to be reached
and tries to generate executions that reach such goals in the
right order. If successful, the input generator would generate
a candidate input, and the oracle would check whether that
input actually fails in the same way as E.
In theory, any automated input generation technique could
be used in this context, as long as it can be guided towards
a goal (e.g., the point of failure, the entry point of a function
on the failure’s call stack, or a branch within the program). In
this work, we decided to use an approach based on symbolic
execution [18]. (It is worth noting that we also considered
the use of weakest precondition analysis as an alternative to
symbolic execution. Because these two techniques are almost
dual, with one being guided from program entry to the point
of failure, and the other from the point of failure to program
entry, we opted for the approach for which a more mature
infrastructure is available.)
Specifically, we use a symbolic execution algorithm cus-
tomized with an ad-hoc search strategy that leverages the
execution data available expressed as a set of goals. Our
algorithm, GenerateInputs, is shown in Algorithm 1. Gener-
ateInputs takes as input icfg, the ICFG for program P , and
goals list, an ordered list of statements to be reached during
the execution. (We discuss the exact content of goals list in
Section IV-C.)
Before starting the symbolic execution, GenerateInputs
performs some initializations (lines 2–4). First, it initializes
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Algorithm 1: GenerateInputs
Input : icfg : ICFG for program P
goals list : an ordered list of statements G0, ...Gn
Output: inputf : candidate input for synthesized run
1 begin
2 sym state0 ← initial symbolic values of program inputs
3 states set← (icfg.entry, true, sym state0, G0)
4 curr goal← G0
5 while true do
6 curr state← null
7 while curr state == null do
8 curr state←
SelNextState(icfg, states set, curr goal)
9 if curr state == null then
10 if curr goal 6= G0 then







18 if curr state.cl == curr goal then
19 if curr goal == Gn then
20 inputf ← solver.getSol(curr state.pc)
21 if inputf is found then
22 return inputf
23 else




28 curr goal← next target in goals list
29 curr state.goal← curr goal
30 end
31 else
32 if curr state.cl ∈ goal list then




37 if curr state.cl is a conditional statement then
38 curr state.pc←
addConstr(curr state.pc, pred, true)
39 curr state.cl← getSucc(curr state.cl, true)
40 if solver.checkSat(curr state.pc) == false then
41 remove(curr state, states set)
42 end
43 false pc←
addConstr(curr state.pc, pred, false)
44 false cl← getSucc(curr state.cl, false)
45 if solver.checkSat(curr state.pc) == true then
46 new state←
(false cl, false pc, curr state.ss, curr state.goal)




symEval(curr state.ss, curr state.cl)




sym state0 with the initial symbolic state, where all inputs
are marked as symbolic. Then, it initializes states set, a set
that will be used to store search states during the execution,
with the initial search state. Entries in states set are quadru-
ples 〈cl, pc, ss, goal〉, where cl is a code location, pc the PC
for the path followed to reach location cl, ss the symbolic
state right before cl, and goal the current target for this state
(used to enforce the order in which goals are reaches). The
initial search state consists of the entry of the program for cl,
PC true, symbolic state sym state0, and goal G0. Next, the
algorithm assigns to curr goal the first goal from goals list.
The algorithm then enters its main loop. At the beginning of
each iteration of the loop, GenerateInputs invokes algorithm
SelNextState, shown in Algorithm 2. SelNextState checks all
the states in the states set, looking for the most promising
state to explore. (At the first invocation of SelNextState,
only the initial state is in the states set. The number of
states will increase in subsequent invocations, when more of
the program has been explored symbolically.) SelNextState
selects states based on the minimum distance mindis, in
terms of number of statements in the ICFG, between each
state’s cl and curr goal. To avoid selecting states that have
not reached goals that precede curr goal in goals list,
SelNextState only considers states whose target is curr goal
(line 5 in Algorithm 2). If none of these states has a cl
that can reach curr goal, SelNextState returns null to
GenerateInputs. Otherwise, the selected state is returned (line
15 in Algorithm 2).
When GenerateInputs receives the candidate state from
SelNextState, it first checks whether the returned state is
null. If so, all states in states set with target curr goal
cannot reach curr goal. Therefore, GenerateInputs would
backtrack by updating curr goal to the previous goal in the
goals list and thus looking for another path that can reach
such goal (line 11).
If GenerateInputs finds a candidate state curr state whose
code location corresponds to curr goal, it updates both
global goal curr goal and local goal curr state.goal to
the next goal in goals list (lines 28–29). It then continues
the symbolic execution. If the last goal Gn is reached, the
algorithm stops the symbolic execution, feeds the current PC
to the SMT solver, and asks the solver to find a solution for
the PC (line 20). If a solution is not found, the generation of
the candidate input is deemed unsuccessful. If GenerateInputs
returns a candidate state curr state whose code location is
not curr goal but another goal in goal list, the algorithm
removes curr state from state set (lines 32–34) because
curr state would reach the goals in the goal list in a different
order from the one observed in the failing execution.
When the symbolic execution reaches a conditional state-
ment pred that involves symbolic values, the algorithm per-
forms one execution step along both branches, that is, it
updates states’ current location and path condition, checks the
feasibility of both branches, and remove infeasible states from
states set (lines 38–47).
For statements other than conditional statements, the al-
gorithm suitably updates the symbolic state and the current
location of states set (lines 50–51).
The algorithm terminates when either there are no more
states to explore (i.e., it tries to back trace from G0 (line 14))
or a candidate input is successfully generated (line 22). In the
former case, our algorithm fails to find a suitable test input.
The latter case, conversely, corresponds to a successful run of
the algorithm.
In summary, our symbolic execution technique has two
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Algorithm 2: SelNextState
Input : icfg : ICFG for program P
states set: set of symbolic states
curr goal: next goal
Output: ret state: candidate state for exploration
1 begin
2 mindis← +∞
3 ret state← null
4 foreach Statei ∈ states set do
5 if Statei.goal == curr goal then
6 if Statei.loc can reach curr goal in ICFG then
7 nd← shortest distance from Statei.loc to
curr goal in ICFG
8 if nd < mindis then
9 mindis← nd





15 return ret state
16 end
key aspects. First, it uses the execution data from the field
to identify a set of intermediate goals that can guide the
exploration of the solution space. Second, it uses a heuristic
based on distance to select which states to consider first when
trying to reach an intermediate goal during the exploration.
In theory, the more data (i.e., number of intermediate goals)
available, the more directed the search, and the higher the like-
lihood of synthesizing a suitable execution. On the other hand,
collecting too much data can have negative consequences in
terms of overhead and introduce privacy issues. To study this
tradeoff, we define several variants of our approach that differ
on the kind of execution data they consider. We describe these
variants in the next section.
B. Applying the algorithm on example code
We concisely illustrate how we can use a call sequence for
a failing execution involving our example code in Figure 2 to
demonstrate how our algorithm works in this case. An example
of failing input is an input of the program starting with two
occurrences “\n” and followed by 251 characters of “a”. A
call sequence for this input is {44, 29, 27, 29, 27, 27, ..., 27}.
Our algorithm will start with a state that can execute the
call site at line 44. Then, because our algorithm always selects
the state with target curr goal, a same state will always be
picked by our algorithm for finding the shortest path to reach
goals in goal list in the given order. The state that reaches
these goals will be selected and executed during the search.
After the selected state reaches all goals in the list, the PC
would be (input[0] = \\) ∧ (input[2] = \\) ∧ (input[1] ≥
a) ∧ (input[1] ≤ z) ∧ (input[3] ≥ a) ∧ (input[3] ≤ z) ∧ ... ∧
(input[255] ≥ a) ∧ (input[255] ≤ z). By feeding this path
condition to the constraint solver, the algorithm can generate
an input that has a similar string structure as the original input
and triggers the same failure.
C. Execution Data
In selecting the execution data to consider, we wanted to
cover a broad spectrum of possibilities. To this end, we se-
lected four kinds of data: POFs, call stacks, call sequences, and
complete program traces. Note that the data are representative
of scenarios that go from knowing as little as possible about
the failing execution to knowing almost everything about it. In
addition, POFs and call stacks are types of data that are very
commonly available for crashes, as they are normally included
in crash reports. Call sequences, and program traces, on the
other hand, are not normally available and represent data that,
if they were shown to be useful, would require changes in the
way programs are monitored and crash reports are generated.
Given these four kinds of execution data, we instantiated
four variations of BUGREDUX that collected and used the
four data. As far as data collection is concerned, the first
two types of execution data do not require any modification
of the program being monitored. All that is needed to use
them is simply to extract them from existing reports. The
other two types of execution data can be collected by means
of well-understood program instrumentation. To collect call
sequences, BUGREDUX instruments all call sites in the pro-
gram,1 whereas to collect program traces it instrument all
branches within the program.
Customizing BUGREDUX so that it uses the different data
is also relatively straightforward, as it amounts to suitably
generating the goals list set to be passed to BUGREDUX’s
input generator. For POF, goals list would contain a single
entry—the POF itself. For a failure’s call stack, there would be
an entry in the set for each function on the stack, correspond-
ing to the first statement of the function, plus an additional
entry for the POF. Call sequences would result in a goals list
that contains an entry for each call, corresponding to the call
statement. Also in this case, there would be an additional, final
entry for the POF. Finally, the goals list for a program trace
would consist of an entry per branch, corresponding to the
statements that is the destination of the branch, and the usual
entry for the POF.
In the next section, we discuss how we used these four
variants of BUGREDUX to study the tradeoffs involved with
the use of different kinds of information and assess the general
usefulness of the proposed approach.
V. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
In our empirical investigation, we addressed the following
research questions:
• RQ1: Can BUGREDUX synthesize executions that are
able to reproduce field failures starting from a set of
execution data?
• RQ2: If so, which types of field data provide the best
tradeoffs in terms of cost benefit?
To address these questions, we implemented the four vari-
ants of BUGREDUX discussed in the previous sections and
applied them to a set of real-world programs. In the rest of
this section, we discuss our implementation of BUGREDUX,
the program and failures we used, our experimental setup, and
the results of our study.
1Note that, for engineering reasons related to the possible presence of
function pointers, BUGREDUX actually instruments also function entry points.
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A. BUGREDUX Implementation
Our implementation of BUGREDUX works on C programs
and consists of three modules that correspond to the three
components shown in our high-level view of the approach (see
Figures 4 and 5): instrumenter, input generator, and oracle.
BUGREDUX’s instrumenter performs static instrumentation
(i.e., probes are added to the code at compile time) by lever-
aging the LLVM compiler infrastructure (http://llvm.org/). The
input generator in BUGREDUX is built on top of KLEE [21], a
symbolic execution engine for C programs. KLEE is an ideal
choice for us because it provides all of the basic symbolic-
execution functionality, which we could reuse, and is easily
extensible and customizable. We were able to implement
Algorithms 1 and 2 as a custom search strategy for KLEE and
only had to perform minor modifications to the underlying
code. Finally, BUGREDUX’s oracle module is implemented
as a simple Perl script that operates as follows. (1) It takes
as input program P , an input I for P , and a crash report C
corresponding to failure F . (2) It runs P against I and collects
any crash report generated as a result of the execution. (3) If
either no report is generated or the call stack and POF in the
generated report do not match those in C, it reports that the
approach failed; it reports a success otherwise.
B. Program Subjects
To investigate our research questions in a real(istic) setting,
we decided to use a set of real, non-trivial programs that
contained one or more faults and had test cases that could
reveal such faults. To do this, we considered programs from
three public repositories that have been used extensively in
previous research: SIR [22], BugBench [23], and exploit-
db [24]. Specifically, we selected three programs from SIR,
two from BugBench, and nine from exploit-db. Table I shows
the relevant information about each program: name; repository
from which it was downloaded and, inparentheses and only
for exploit-db, the ID of the corresponding repository entry;
size; and the number of faults it contains. As the table shows,
the program sizes range between 0.5 kLOC and 241 kLOC,
and each program contains one or two faults. The faults in the
BugBench’s and exploit-db’s programs are real faults, whereas
the ones in the programs from SIR are seeded.
We selected these programs because they have been used
in previous research [24], [25] and because of the representa-
tiveness of their faults. The faults in exploit-db and BugBench
are real faults mostly discovered by users in the field, whereas
the faults in SIR are seeded by researchers but are carefully
designed to simulate real faults.
We excluded from our study three programs from SIR
and four from BugBench because our current prototype, and
more specifically its underlying symbolic execution engine,
could not handle some of the constructs in these programs
(e.g., complex interactions with the environment and network
inputs). As far as faults are concerned, we selected faults that
caused a program crash, rather than just generating an incor-
rect output. This choice was simply made for convenience and
Table I
SUBJECT PROGRAMS USED IN OUR STUDY.
Name Repository Description Size # Faults
(kLOC)
sed SIR stream editor 14 2
grep SIR pattern-matching utility 10 1
gzip SIR compression utility 5 2
ncompress BugBench (de)compression utility 2 1
polymorph BugBench file system “unixier” 1 1
aeon exploit-db mail relay agent 3 1
(CVE-2005-1019)
iwconfig exploit-db wireless tool 11 1
(CVE-2003-0947)
glftpd exploit-db FTP server 6 1
(OSVDB-ID#16373)
htget exploit-db file grabber 3 1
(CVE-2004-0852)
socat exploit-db multipurpose relay 35 1
(CVE-2004-1484)
tipxd exploit-db IPX tunneling daemon 7 1
(OSVDB-ID#12346)
aspell exploit-db spell checker 0.5 1
(CVE-2004-0548)
exim exploit-db message transfer agent 241 1
(EDB-ID#796)
rsync exploit-db file synchronizer 67 1
(CVE-2004-2093)
xmail exploit-db email server 1 1
(CVE-2005-2943)
to minimize experimental bias—with crashes, failures can be
objectively identified and do not require the manual encoding
of the failure condition as an assertion.
We also performed a preliminary check on the programs
(and faults) that we selected by feeding them to an unmodified
version of KLEE and letting it run for 72 hours. The goal of
this check was to assess whether the faults considered could
have been discovered by a technique that blindly tries to cover
as much of the programs as possible. If so, this would be
an indication that the faults are easy to reveal and, thus, are
probably not good candidates for our study. An unmodified
version of KLEE was able to discovered the faults in only
one of the subjects: iwconfig.
C. Experimental Setup
In order to collect the data needed for our investigation,
we proceeded as follows. To simulate the occurrence of field
failures, we used the test cases distributed with our subject
programs as proxies for real users. For each fault f considered,
we ran the test cases until a test case tf failed and generated
a program crash; we associated tf to f as its failing input.
We then reran all the failing inputs on all the corresponding
faulty programs three times. The first time, we ran them on
the unmodified programs, the second time on the programs
instrumented by BUGREDUX to collect call sequences, and
the third time on the programs instrumented by BUGREDUX
to collect complete program traces. For each such execution,
we measured the duration of the execution and the size of the
execution data generated.
With this information available, we used the four variants
of BUGREDUX to synthesize a failing execution starting from
a suitable set of goals (i.e., POF, call stack at the time of
failure, call sequence, and complete program trace). For each
run of BUGREDUX, we recorded whether the generation was
successful (i.e., whether a candidate input was generated at all)
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Table II
TIME OVERHEAD IMPOSED ON THE SUBJECT PROGRAMS.
Name POF Call stack Call sequence Complete trace
sed.fault1 0 0 4.5% 27.2%
sed.fault2 0 0 12.5% 87.5%
grep 0 0 47% 182%
gzip.fault1 0 0 10.3% 72%
gzip.fault2 0 0 12% 308%
ncompress 0 0 2% 16%
polymorph 0 0 1% 8%
aeon 0 0 50% 1066%
iwconfig 0 0 7% 128%
glftpd 0 0 9% 45%
htget 0 0 9% 287%
socat 0 0 21% 110%
tipxd 0 0 2% 36%
aspell 0 0 18.8% 143%
exim 0 0 17.4% 389%
rsync 0 0 3% 66%
xmail 0 0 22.6% 290%
and how long it took for the synthesis. We set a timeout of
72 hours for the generation, after which we marked the run as
unsuccessful. We also recorded whether the candidate input,
if one was generated, could reproduce the original failure
according to BUGREDUX’s oracle.
D. Results and Discussion
This section presents the results of our empirical study and
discusses the implication of the results in terms of our two
research questions. We present the results using four tables,
where the first two tables contain the data related to the cost
of the approach (i.e., the time and space overhead imposed by
BUGREDUX), and the last two tables show the data about the
effectiveness of the approach (i.e., whether BUGREDUX was
able to synthesize an execution and whether such execution
could be used to reproduce an observed failure). We provide a
set of tables that present the results for each of the 17 failing
executions considered (identified by the name of the failing
program, possibly followed by a fault ID) and for each of the
variants of BUGREDUX (identified by the kind of execution
data on which it operates).
Table II shows the time overhead imposed by BUGREDUX
on the subject programs, measured as the percentage increase
of the running time due to the instrumentation added by
BUGREDUX. Because POF and call stacks are collected by
the runtime system at the moment of the failure and do not
require any additional instrumentation, collecting them incurs
no overhead. The situation is different for call sequences and
complete traces, which both require BUGREDUX to instrument
the programs (see Section IV-C). As expected, the overhead
imposed by complete-trace collection is almost an order of
magnitude higher than that for call sequences. We also observe
that the overhead for collecting call sequences depends on
program size and execution length. To correctly interpret the
results, it is important to consider that this data was collected
with a straw-man instrumentation that simply writes events to
the log as soon as they occur; the use of caching techniques
could decrease the overhead dramatically. Because the goal
of this initial investigation was more exploratory, and the
numbers are acceptable, we left such optimization for future
work.
Table III
SIZE OF EXECUTION-DATA COLLECTED (KB).
Name POF Call stack Call sequence Complete trace
sed.fault1 0.8 0.8 5.8 54.4
sed.fault2 0.9 0.9 10.2 261.9
grep 0.7 0.7 3.4 716.1
gzip.fault1 0.8 0.8 2.0 176
gzip.fault2 0.8 0.8 2.5 1784.6
ncompress 0.7 0.7 0.9 33.1
polymorph 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.5
aeon 1 1 1.1 3
iwconfig 1 1 3 594
glftpd 1.5 1.5 3.2 130
htget 0.7 0.7 2.7 2814
socat 0.8 0.8 9.6 451
tipxd 0.6 0.6 0.7 19
aspell 0.6 0.6 30.5 566
exim 0.9 0.9 100.7 14897
rsync 1 1 11.4 521
xmail 0.8 0.8 84.8 2361
Table III shows the size of the different kinds of execution
data collected by BUGREDUX. Note that the data size for
POFs and call stacks is the same because our current imple-
mentation of BUGREDUX extracts them both from the crash
reports generated by the runtime system. We therefore report
the size of the crash reports for these two types of data. Also
in this case, the size of the complete-trace data is at least an
order of magnitude larger than that of the call-sequence data,
and in some cases the difference is even more extreme. For
instance, in the case of gzip.fault2, the reason for the large
gap is that the number of function calls is low but there is a
large number of loop iterations within functions. Overall, for
the executions considered, the size of the execution data is
fairly contained, and it would be practical to collect them.
The last two tables are the most relevant for our investiga-
tion, as they address the core question of the effectiveness of
the approach. Specifically, Table IV shows how many failing
executions BUGREDUX was able to mimic and, for those, how
long it took for the input generation. Entries of type “N/A” in
the table indicate cases where the input generator was not able
to produce a candidate input within the time limit assigned (72
hours). As expected, symbolic execution guided only by the
POF is unlikely to be successful for most programs. A manual
examination of the programs for which POFs are enough
to reproduce failures showed that all such failures have two
common characteristics: (1) the POFs are close to the entry
of the programs and are easy to reach; (2) the failures can
be triggered by simply reaching the POFs. For these failures,
developers could easily identify the corresponding faults if
provided with traditional crash reports. As also expected, the
more information is available in the form of intermediate goals
that can guide the exploration, the better the performance of
the approach. Using stack traces, BUGREDUX can mimic 11
out of the 17 failing executions, and using call sequences, it
can mimic all but 1 failing execution (the one in program
exim).
In some cases (e.g., htget, tipxd), the time needed to
synthesize an execution using call stacks is larger than the
time needed in the case of call sequences, when they are both
successful. The reason for this result is that the additional
information provided by call sequences can better guide sym-
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Table IV
EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF BUGREDUX IN SYNTHESIZING
EXECUTIONS STARTING FROM COLLECTED EXECUTION DATA.
Name POF Call stack Call sequence Whole trace
sed.fault1 N/A N/A 98s N/A
sed.fault2 N/A N/A 17349s N/A
grep N/A 16s 48s N/A
gzip.fault1 3s 18s 11s N/A
gzip.fault2 20s 28s 25s N/A
ncompress 155s 158s 158s N/A
polymorph 65s 66s 66s N/A
aeon 1s 1s 1s 1s
rysnc N/A N/A 88s N/A
iwconfig 5s 5s 5s N/A
glftpd 5s 5s 4s N/A
htget 53s 53s 9s N/A
socat N/A N/A 876s N/A
tipxd 27s 27s 5s N/A
aspell 5s 5s 12s N/A
xmail N/A N/A 154s N/A
exim N/A N/A N/A N/A
bolic execution and avoid many irrelevant paths. The reduced
number of explored paths would obviously result in less time
needed for synthesizing an execution.
One surprising finding is that this trend is not confirmed
when complete traces are used as a guide. We investigated
this behavior and found that the main reason for this behavior
is that, intuitively, complete traces somehow provide too much
guidance to the input generator. Having a complete trace
forces symbolic execution to follow exactly the same path
as the original failing execution, which is useful in terms of
imitating the failure’s behavior, but in most cases results in
potentially long paths that contain conditions that the SMT
solver cannot handle. Conversely, a looser yet informative
guidance, such as a call sequence, leaves more degrees of
freedom to the input generator and increases its chances of
success. For example, paths that result in constraints that are
beyond the capabilities of the SMT solver would be dropped
in favor of simpler paths that may still reach the targeted
goal. In a sense, among the execution data we considered,
call sequences represent a sweet spot between providing too
little and too much information to the search.
It is important to stress that these synthetic executions are
executions that reach all of the intermediate goals extracted
from the execution data and provided to the input generator,
but they are not guaranteed to reproduce the observed failure.
Consider again our initial example in Figure 2. It is easy
to synthesize an execution that reaches line 44 in function
main and line 27 in function process, but that execution
is unlikely to fail, as we discussed in Section III. This is
especially true when considering the more limited types of
execution data, such as POFs and call stacks, which provide
little guidance to the search. The results in Table V clearly
illustrate this issue. In the table, a “Y” (resp., “N”) in a
cell indicates that, for the failure corresponding to that row,
the synthetic execution generated by BUGREDUX using the
execution data of the corresponding column was able (resp.,
was unable) to reproduce the failure. (The values in the last
column are all “N” except for aeon because, as we saw in
Table IV, BUGREDUX was not able to generate synthetic
executions for most of the failures when using complete
Table V
EFFECTIVENESS OF SYNTHETIC EXECUTIONS IN REPRODUCING
OBSERVED FAILURES.
Name POF Call stack Call sequence Complete trace
sed.fault1 N N Y N
sed.fault2 N N Y N
grep N N Y N
gzip.fault1 Y Y Y N
gzip.fault2 N N Y N
ncompress Y Y Y N
polymorph Y Y Y N
aeon Y Y Y Y
rsync N N Y N
iwconfig Y Y Y N
glftpd Y Y Y N
htget N N Y N
socat N N Y N
tipxd Y Y Y N
aspell N N Y N
xmail N N Y N
exim N N N N
traces.)
As shown in the table, for the seven simple programs in
our set reaching POF is enough to trigger the original failure.
Conversely, for the four failures in grep, gzip, htget and
aspell, BUGREDUX was able to synthesize executions that
generated the same call stacks as the failing executions, but
such synthetic executions did not reproduce the considered
failures. All synthetic executions but one (for one of exim’s
failures) generated from call sequences were able to reproduce
the original failures, which provides clear evidence of the
usefulness of this type of execution data.
E. Discussion
The results of our investigation, albeit preliminary, let us
address our two research questions and make some obser-
vations. As far as RQ1 is concerned, our results provide
initial evidence that, for the programs and failures consid-
ered, BUGREDUX can reproduce observed failures starting
from a set of execution data. For RQ2, the results provide
initial but clear evidence that call sequences represent the
best choice, among the ones considered, in terms of cost-
benefit tradeoffs: using call sequences, BUGREDUX was able
to reproduce 16 out of 17 observed failures; even using an
unoptimized instrumentation, BUGREDUX was able to collect
call sequences with an acceptable time and space overhead;
and in general, call sequences are unlikely to reveal sensitive
or confidential information about an execution. (Although this
is just anecdotical evidence, we observed that none of the
inputs generated by synthesizing call sequences corresponds
to the original input that caused the failure.) Unlike complete
traces, which may provide enough information to reverse
engineer the execution and identify the inputs that caused such
execution, call sequences are a much more abstract model of
an execution. The fact that BUGREDUX was able to synthesize
failing executions using call sequences and not complete traces
should not be misleading in this respect. Consider that (1) the
inputs to the failing executions may have little to do with those
of the synthesized execution2 and (2) a complete trace may
2For example, in program ncompress, the original input that makes the
program fail contains 1520 ”a” characters, whereas the input generated by
BUGREDUX is a sequence of more than 1600 random characters.
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Table VI
MINIMAL NUMBER OF ENTRIES IN CALL SEQUENCES REQUIRED TO
REPRODUCE FAILURES







be difficult to handle for an algorithm, but may reveal much
more information to a human being.
An additional observation that can be made based on the
results is that POFs and call stacks do not appear to be very
useful in reproducing failures. Manual examination of the
faults considered showed that the points where the failure is
observed tend to be distant from the fault. Therefore, most
such failures are triggered only when the program executes
the faulty code, and the incorrect program state propagates to
the point of failure. In these cases, POFs and call stacks are
unlikely to help because the faulty code may be nowhere near
the POF or the functions on the stack at the moment of the
crash. If confirmed, this would be an interesting finding, as
these two types of execution data are normally collected in
crash report. Extending crash reports with additional informa-
tion may make them considerably more useful to developers.
In general, it is well known that the problem of synthesizing
(inputs for) an execution that reaches a given point in a
program is undecidable, as it can easily be reduced to the
termination problem. Therefore, intuitively, we would expect
that more guidance in the search for such an execution
could only improve the chances of finding it. One interesting
observation that we can derive from our results contradicts this
intuition. As we discussed earlier in this section, providing too
much guidance may be just as problematic as providing too
little of it. In other words, these results seem to suggest that a
sweet spot may be found that would allow enough freedom for
the search to explore different possibilities, but also enough
guidance to direct the search to its target.
As a further step towards the identification of such sweet
spot, we performed an additional exploratory study in which
we removed entries in call sequences and studied whether
the partial sequences still contained enough information to
recreate observed failures. More precisely, we selected six
failures from the original list and, for each failure and cor-
responding call sequence, removed entries from the sequence
until BUGREDUX was unable to reproduce the failure at hand
using the resulting reduced sequence. Table VI shows the
result of this study in terms of number of entries in the call
sequences before and after reduction. For example, only 3
of the 34 entries in the original call sequence are needed to
reproduce the observed failure in grep. From the results, we
can observe that in most cases only a small subset of calls
in the sequences is actually necessary to suitably guide the
exploration. We can further observe that the number of entries
needed seems to increase with the complexity of the program
input. For instance, sed.fault1 can only be triggered by an
input file that include a sed script, and aspell’s fault can only
be triggered by an input of a given length; for these two faults,
the reduction in the call sequence is less substantial than for
the other faults considered. These additional results motivate
further research in this direction, as we discuss in Section VII.
Limitations and Threats to Validity: The research pre-
sented is still in a relatively early stage. As such, there
are limitations to the approach proposed and threats in the
empirical investigation we performed. One limitation of BU-
GREDUX is due to the fact that it relies on symbolic execution,
an inherently complex and expensive approach. However,
recent results have shown that, if suitably defined, tuned,
and engineered, symbolic execution can scale even to large
system [26]. Moreover, as we discuss in our future work,
our approach can leverage different execution-synthesis tech-
niques. Another limitation of BUGREDUX is that we currently
do not explicitly handle concurrency and non-determinism.
Conceptually, we could have considered execution data that
included concurrency related information, and extended BU-
GREDUX accordingly. However, in this initial phase of the
research, we chose to focus on a smaller domain, and get
a better understanding of that domain, before considering
additional issues.
Like for all studies, there are threats to the validity of
our results. As far as our implementation of BUGREDUX is
concerned, we tested it on small examples and spot checked
many of the results presented in the paper, which mitigated
the risk of reporting erroneous results. In terms of external
validity, our results may not generalize to other programs and
failures. However, we studied 17 failures and 15 programs
from three different software repositories. The subjects we
used are real-world programs, several of which are widely
used both by real users in the field and by researchers as
experimental subjects. Another issue with the empirical results
is that the ultimate evidence of the usefulness of the technique
would require its use in a real setting and with real users.
Although such an evaluation would be extremely useful, and
we plan to do it in the future, we believe that it would be
premature at this point. In fact, it is typical for most research in
the area of debugging to perform extensive evaluations in-vitro
to understand and fine tune the techniques before performing
an expensive human study.
Overall, we believe that our results, albeit preliminary
in nature, are promising and motivate further research in
this area. If confirmed by additional studies and research,
these results may result in new and more effective ways of
debugging and improving software quality.
VI. RELATED WORK
Debugging is an extremely prolific area of research, and the
related work is consequently vast. In this section, we focus on
the work that is most closely related to our approach.
Our work is related to automated test-input generation
techniques, such as those based on symbolic execution (e.g.,
[19]–[21], [27]) and random generation (e.g., [28], [29]).
Generally, these techniques target the problem of generating
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inputs that trigger or discover faults in a program. As our
results show, these techniques are generally not applicable to
the problem we are targeting.
Techniques that capture program behaviors by monitoring
or sampling field executions are also related to ours (e.g.,
[5], [7], [11]). These techniques usually capture execution
events and possibly interactions between programs and the
running environment to later replay or analyze them in house.
These approaches tend to either capture too much information,
and thus raise practicality and privacy issues, or too little
information, and thus be ineffective in our context.
More recently, researchers started investigating approaches
to replay field failures using more limited information. For
example, some researchers used weakest preconditions to find
inputs that can trigger certain types of exceptions in Java
programs [30]–[32]. These approaches, however, target only
certain types of exceptions and tend to operate locally at the
module level. Another approach, SherLog [33], makes use
of run-time logs to reconstruct paths near logging statements
to help developers to identify bugs. This approach does not
aim to generate program inputs, but rather to highlight code
areas potentially related to a failure. Zamfir and Candea
introduce a technique for automated debugging based on input
generation [34]. Given a POF, they use symbolic execution
to try to generate inputs that would reach the POF. As we
showed in this paper, without additional guidance, symbolic
execution techniques are unlikely to be successful in this
context. Unlike our approach, however, they can handle multi-
threaded programs; it would be interesting to investigate a
combination of the two techniques. Another approach that
targets concurrency issues is that by Park and colleagues, who
presented PRES (probabilistic replay via execution sketching)
to help reproduce concurrency bugs [35]. Their technique
mostly focuses on replaying issues related to concurrency, so
it is also complementary to our approach.
It is nowadays common practice to use software (e.g.,
Breakpad [36]) or OS capabilities (e.g., Windows Error Re-
porting [2] and Mac OS Crash Reporter [3]) to automatically
collect crash reports from the field. As we discussed earlier,
these reports can be used to correlate different failures reported
from the field. DebugAdvisor [37], for instance, is a tool
that analyzes crash reports to help find a solution to the
reported problem by identifying developers, code, and other
known bugs that may be correlated to the report. Although
these techniques have been shown to be useful, they target
a different problem, and the information they collect is too
limited to allow for recreating field failures.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
It is well known that the ability of reproducing an observed
failure is one of the key elements of debugging. Whereas
recreating failures that occur during in-house testing is usually
easy, doing so for failures that occur in the field, on user
machines is unfortunately an arduous task, even when bug
reports are available. To address this important problem, we
have presented BUGREDUX, a general approach for support-
ing in-house debugging of field failures. At a high level, our
approach is based on the idea of collecting data about program
runs in the field, sending this information back to developers
when a failure is observed, and using this information in
house to mimic the failing execution and try to reproduce
the observed failure. To do this, BUGREDUX extracts from the
execution data collected in the field a sequence of intermediate
goals (i.e., statements in the program) and tries to generate an
execution that reaches such goals. BUGREDUX is currently
implemented for the C language and freely available for
download as open source.1
To better understand the tradeoffs between amount of
information collected and effectiveness of the approach, we
performed an empirical investigation in which we studied the
performance of four instances of BUGREDUX that leverage
different kinds of execution data. We applied these four
instances to a set of 17 failures for 15 real-world programs
and compared their cost and effectiveness. Our results are
encouraging and provide evidence that BUGREDUX, when
operating on a suitable set of data, can successfully reproduce,
in house, failures observed in a different context. In addition,
some of the findings confirm our intuition, whereas other are
unexpected (e.g., more information is not always better than
less information). Finally, the study provide insight that can
guide future work in this area.
In the immediate, we will perform additional experiments
to assess whether our initial results are confirmed when
BUGREDUX is applied to a larger set of programs and failures.
Another topic for future work is the identification of other
kinds of execution data that may be useful in this context.
Among the data we considered so far, call sequences appear to
be an optimal choice. Despite their performance in our initial
investigation, however, there may be cases where collecting
execution data whose size is bounded in the size of the
program would be preferable. This topic could be investigated
along several directions. One direction could involve the use of
execution data consisting of dynamic models of the program,
such as dynamic call graphs, and use these models to prune
the search space during input generation. Another alternative
would be the investigation of efficient (and possibly partial)
ways to represent potentially unbounded data, for example
using some form of automata. Our approach currently assumes
that all parts of a failing execution are equally relevant when
trying to reproduce the failure. Intuitively, some parts of
the execution, or even of a program in general, may be
more relevant than others. If so, collecting information at
different levels of details for different parts may allow for
an accurate reproduction of the failure even in the presence
of less data. Our preliminary study on the use of partial
call sequences provides evidence that support this research
direction. Finally, symbolic execution is only one possible way
to generate execution that can reproduce an observed failure.
We will investigate alternative techniques for synthesizing
failing executions, such as techniques based on backward
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(rather than forward) exploration (e.g., [30]), techniques based
on genetic algorithms (e.g., [38]), and techniques that take
advantage of existing test inputs using some fort of fuzzing
(e.g., [14]).
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